Individuals save for their old days, but not all of them enjoy the old age. This paper characterizes the optimal capital accumulation in a twoperiod OLG model where lifetime is risky and varies across individuals. We compare two long-run social optima: (1) the average utilitarian optimum, where steady-state average welfare is maximized; (2) the egalitarian optimum, where the welfare of the worst-o¤ at the steady-state is maximized. It is shown that, under plausible conditions, the egalitarian optimum involves a higher capital and a lower fertility than the utilitarian optimum. Those inequalities hold also in a second-best framework where survival conditions are exogenously linked to the capital level.
Introduction
Following early contributions by Phelps (1961 Phelps ( , 1965 and Diamond (1965) , the study of the optimal capital accumulation consists in deriving formal conditions under which the capital stock maximizes the consumption per head at the stationary equilibrium. In a two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model with no technological progress, the Golden Rule states that steady-state consumption per head is maximized when the marginal productivity of capital equals the sum of the cohort growth rate and the depreciation rate of capital.
The standard Golden Rule concerns the long-run dynamics of an economy. Given that the population is likely to vary strongly over long periods of time, it is natural to explore whether the Golden Rule remains valid in a more general framework with a varying demography. In a pioneer contribution, Samuelson (1975) showed that, when the social planner chooses the fertility rate in addition to capital, the Golden Rule still prevails, with the di¤erence that the cohort growth rate in the Golden Rule formula takes now its optimal value. More recently, the Golden Rule was also shown to be robust to the inclusion of the survival rate in the social planning program (see de la Croix et al. 2012) .
But the introduction of a variable population size raises serious di¢ culties regarding the selection of an adequate social objective. Those di¢ culties are general, and occur each time we face what Par…t (1984) called a "di¤erent number choice", including in the particular context of optimal capital accumulation. 1 For instance, the "optimal" fertility derived by Samuelson (1975) depends on the particular social objective -average utilitarianism -that he assumed. Other normative criteria could have been used instead, as there is no decisive argument supporting that particular social welfare criterion. 2 The existence of risky and unequal lifetimes tends also to question the social objective to be pursued when considering optimal capital accumulation. 3 To see this, consider a 2-period OLG economy, where the survival from the …rst period (working period) to the second period (retirement) occurs with an exogenous probability . Under standard assumptions on individual preferences, all young agents save, at the laissez-faire, some resources for their old days. The problem is that, at the next period, only a fraction of savers will enjoy their savings, whereas a fraction 1 of the savers will not. 4 It follows from this that, at the laissez-faire, there exist substantial welfare inequalities across members of a given cohort, between agents who turn out to be long-lived and agents who turn out to be short-lived. The latter ones su¤er not only from a shorter life, but, also, from the lost savings due to unanticipated death.
From a normative perspective, welfare losses due to longevity inequalities are problematic. Indeed, even if it is true that all agents did, at the young age, what they planned to do, and saved as much as they wanted, it remains nonetheless that those savings decisions were made ex ante, that is, before one knows one's own longevity, and, as such, had to rely on survival probabilities. Those probabilities are useful information when making decisions in front of risk, but the problem is that, at the individual level, those probabilities all turn out to be false ex post. In the second period, each agent is either alive or dead, and if he had known, in advance, his actual longevity -rather than his expected longevity -he would probably have saved di¤erently. One can thus, following Fleurbaey (2010) , interpret situations of risk as situations of incomplete information: young agents who save resources for their old age do not know their actual length of life, and this lack of knowledge casts some doubt on the capacity of those agents to do what is the best for them.
Interpreting situations of risk as situations of incomplete information supports, as argued by Fleurbaey (2010) , the replacement of (standard) ex ante social welfare criteria, which rely on individual expected outcomes, by ex post social welfare criteria, which are based on individual realized outcomes. Note that those two families of social criteria can, in some cases, lead to similar optimal allocations. For instance, as emphasized by Hammond (1981) , the average utilitarian social objective can be interpreted either as the expected utility of a representative agent, or as the average realized welfare in the society. However, once there is some ethical concern for equality, the distinction between ex ante and ex post social welfare criteria becomes crucial. 5 In the example of prematurely dead savers, where longevity inequalities are exogenous, there is a strong support for adopting an egalitarian social objective. Indeed, as argued by Fleurbaey (2008) , welfare inequalities are acceptable only if these result from di¤erences in responsibility characteristics, but not if these result from circumstance characteristics, for which individuals cannot be held responsible. Given that prematurely dead savers cannot be regarded as responsible for their realized longevity, there exists a strong ethical support for adopting egalitarian social objectives in that context. Therefore, if we interpret the situation of risky longevity as a situation of incomplete information, there is a strong support for adopting an ex post egalitarian social objective, which favors the reduction of inequalities in ex post lifetime welfare.
That rationale has led Fleurbaey et al. (2010) to study, in a two-period model with risky lifetime, the optimal allocation of resources, under a social objective focusing on the realized welfare of the individuals who turn out to be the worst-o¤ ex post, that is, after individual longevities have been revealed. 6 In that paper, it is shown that the ex post egalitarian optimal allocation achieves a full compensation for premature death, that is, it makes, ex post, short-lived and long-lived agents equally well-o¤. That result is somewhat surprising: compensation for a premature death may seem a priori unfeasible, because short-lived individuals cannot be identi…ed ex ante, and cannot be a¤ected by any transfer ex post. However, it is possible to provide a full compensation to the short-lived by concentrating the consumption of resources early on the lifecycle.
Whereas that ex post egalitarian social objective may seem quite plausible in a static framework, it is not obvious to see what its consequences are for the optimal capital accumulation problem. How would a fair capital accumulation rule look like? To what extent would this di¤er from the standard Golden Rule? More precisely, does egalitarianism lead to a lower or, alternatively, to a higher optimal capital in comparison to standard average utilitarianism?
The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal capital accumulation 5 On the distinction between equality of opportunity ex ante and equality of opportunity ex post, see Fleurbaey and Peragine (2012) . 6 Note that, in general, the worst-o¤ individuals are those who turn out to have a shorter life than others. But, as we discuss below, this is not necessarily the case.
in an economy where individual lifetime is risky, and where individuals turn out to have unequal longevities. For that purpose, we consider a two-period OLG model where the probability of survival to the old age (second period) depends on the level of preventive health investment per worker made during the young age (…rst period). Within that framework, we characterize the optimal capital accumulation rule under two distinct long-run social optima: on the one hand, the average utilitarian criterion, which focuses on the steady-state average welfare; on the other hand, the ex post egalitarian criterion, which focuses on the welfare of the worst-o¤ individuals born at the steady-state.
The reason why we introduce here an endogenous survival probability has to do with the recent emphasis on the determinants of mortality variations in the OLG literature. 7 Note, however, that the above discussion on the choice of an adequate social objective under unequal longevities is also relevant for that literature. For instance, models by Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) , Chakraborty (2004) and Galor and Moav (2005) are frameworks where agents do not choose their life expectancy, which depends on the level of human capital (in Blackburn and Cipriani), on the level of physical capital (in Ckakraborty), or on the genetic type of the agent (in Galor and Moav) . Other models, such as Bhattacharya and Qiao (2005) and Boucekkine and La¤argue (2010) include agents who can a¤ect their life expectancy through some investment in their health, but still cannot choose a certain lifetime. In those models, agents with the same health investment can actually turn out to have unequal longevities. 8 Therefore, those economies, where agents can hardly be regarded as responsible for inequalities in realized longevity, invite an ex post egalitarian social objective. The present paper proposes to characterize optimal capital accumulation under such a social objective, and contrasts it with the one under standard average utilitarianism.
Anticipating on our results, we …rst show that, when the fertility rate is exogenously given, the egalitarian social optimum involves the same optimal capital as under average utilitarianism. However, once fertility is chosen by the social planner, the egalitarian optimum involves, under plausible conditions on production, a higher optimal capital and a lower optimal fertility than the average utilitarian optimum. Thus being egalitarian reinforces the necessity to accumulate capital. Finally, we show that our results remain globally valid in a second-best framework where longevity investments are not directly chosen by the social planner, but are exogenously related to the capital level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives optimal capital and fertility under average utilitarianism. Section 4 characterizes the social optimum under an ex post egalitarian objective. Section 5 considers the second-best framework where health investments are exogenously linked to the capital level. Section 6 concludes. 7 See the survey by Boucekkine et al. (2008) . 8 This is also the case in the real world, where longevity inequalities are largely due to factors on which individuals have no in ‡uence, such as genetic background (see Christensen et al 2006) . Note also that, even though empirical studies, such as Kaplan et al. (1987) , Contoyannis and Jones (2004) and Balia and Jones (2008) , highlight the impact of some behaviors on the average (or expected ) longevity, those studies identify only risk factors, but not factors a¤ecting, for sure, the longevity realized at the individual level.
The model
We consider an OLG model with the same population structure and production technology as in the model developed by Chakraborty (2004) . Time is discrete and goes from 0 to in…nity. Longevity is risky: all agents live a …rst period (young age), but do not necessarily survive to the second period (old age).
Demography. The size of the cohort born at time t is denoted by L t . Each young adult has n children (n 0):
All members of cohort t live the …rst period for sure, but only a proportion t+1 of that cohort will survive to the second period. The proportion of survivors t+1 depends on the amount of health expenditures per young adult h t :
We assume, as usual, that 0 < (h t ) < 1 for all h t 0, and that 0 (h t ) > 0. It is also assumed that (0) =~ > 0 and that lim ht!1 (h t ) = < 1.
Preferences. Agents have time-additive lifetime welfare, which depends on consumption per period. If the utility of being dead is normalized to zero, the lifetime welfare of the short-lived agents of cohort t, denoted by U sl t , is:
where we assume, as usual, that u 0 (c t ) > 0 and u 00 (c t ) < 0, that is, that temporal welfare is increasing and concave in consumption c t . 9 For the long-lived members of cohort t, lifetime welfare, denoted by U ll t , is: 10
where d t+1 is the consumption at the old age. When considering the optimal health investment, a central aspect of preferences concerns the intercept of the temporal utility function. Following the literature, we assume that there exists a consumption c 0 such that: 11
Put it di¤erently, there exists a welfare-neutral consumption level c that makes an individual indi¤erent between further life with that consumption and death.
Production. The production of an output Y t involves labour L t and capital K t , according to the production function:
where K t denotes the total capital stock, while L t is the labour force, which coincides here with the whole cohort at birth. The function F ( ) is a positivelyvalued production function, increasing and strictly concave with respect to capital. Capital depreciates at a constant rate , with 0 < 1. Under constant returns to scale, the production function can be written as:
where y t is the output per worker, and k t is the capital stock per worker, while f ( ) = F (k t ; 1) denotes the production function in its intensive form. Under the above assumptions on F ( ), we have,
The marginal productivity of labour is:
From the concavity of f (k t ), we have:
Resource constraint The resource constraint of the economy, stating that what is produced is either consumed or invested, is:
At the steady-state and in intensive terms, we have:
Note the roles played by demographic variables in the resource constraint. The fertility rate n has two e¤ects: on the one hand, n puts some pressure on the available resources (the LHS), by reducing, ceteris paribus, the sustainable capital available for each worker (i.e. the "Solow e¤ect"); on the other hand, n also a¤ects the spending part of the constraint (the RHS), by weakening the weight of the elderly's consumption (i.e. the "Samuelson e¤ect"). The survival rate only a¤ects the economy's spending (RHS), by making the old's (aggregate) consumption larger ceteris paribus.
The utilitarian …rst-best problem
To characterize the optimal capital accumulation, we will focus here on a stationary equilibrium, where all per worker variables k t , h t and t are constant over time, whereas all aggregate variables, such as production Y t , total capital stock K t , and total consumption C t grow at a rate n. 13 We consider the problem of a utilitarian social planner, who selects capital, consumptions, health investment and fertility in such a way as to maximize the average lifetime welfare prevailing at the stationary equilibrium, subject to the resource constraint of the economy. That planning problem is: 
where is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint, while is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint for h. The …rst-order conditions (FOCs) can be rewritten as:
as well as the conditions
with complementary slackness. From condition (11), we see that the marginal rate of substitution between consumptions at the two ages of life should be equal to the optimal fertility rate n. Expression (12) is the standard Golden Rule for optimal capital accumulation, stating that the marginal productivity of capital should be equal to the sum of the depreciation rate of capital and the cohort growth rate n 1.
Condition (13) states that the optimal fertility n should be such that the (negative) capital dilution e¤ect (the LHS) equals the (positive) intergenerational e¤ect (the RHS). Note that, on the basis of equation (13), nothing guarantees that the optimal fertility n is higher (or equal to) the replacement fertility level n = 1. Thus it is possible to have an optimal fertility n strictly below the replacement fertility rate (n = 1), with the corollary that the population becomes extinct asymptotically. That case is especially likely to prevail when the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect is small in comparison with the capital dilution e¤ect.
Condition (14) states that an interior optimal health investment h exists only if there exists some level of h > 0 such that the marginal welfare loss from foregone consumption (1st term of the LHS) equals the marginal welfare gain from health investment (2nd term of the LHS), yielding = 0. That condition holds if and only if we have, under h > 0:
That equality requires that the second period is, at the optimum, worth being lived, that is, that u(d) > 0 or d > c. This condition is satis…ed either when individuals assign a high value to life (i.e. c is low), or when the economy is very productive, insuring that the optimal second-period consumption exceeds c. 14 That latter assumption is quite weak, and so we can expect, under general conditions, an interior optimal health investment.
Proposition 1 summarizes our results.
Proposition 1 The average utilitarian …rst-best optimum fc ; d ; k ; n ; h g is such that:
Proof. See the above FOCs. The above conditions are necessary, but not su¢ cient for an interior optimum. As it is well-known, su¢ ciency requires to consider second-order conditions, which may not be satis…ed under endogenous fertility and mortality. Given that the literature has already examined those second-order conditions, we will here assume that second-order conditions are satis…ed, so that the above …rst-order conditions characterize the interior social optimum. 15 Finally, it should be stressed here that the conditions mentioned in Proposition 1 may be satis…ed by several distinct vectors fc ; d ; k ; n ; h g, so that those conditions do not guarantee the uniqueness of the social optimum. Actually, in the simple case where demography is …xed, i.e. n = n and = , simple assumptions on the production function f (k) [f (k) > 0, f 0 (k) > 0, f 00 (k) < 0 for k > 0] and on the utility function u(c) [u(c) > 0, u 00 (c) < 0 for c > 0, as well as lim c!0 u 0 (c) = +1], together with the assumption f 0 (+1) < + n 1 < f 0 (0), su¢ ce to guarantee the uniqueness of the utilitarian social optimum (see de la Croix and Michel 2002 p. 78-79) . However, once n and are variables, the uniqueness issue becomes much trickier, since standard assumptions on production and utility functions do no longer guarantee the uniqueness of the social optimum. We do not explore the uniqueness issue further here, since our emphasis in this paper lies on the comparison of that utilitarian optimum with the egalitarian optimum, and, for that purpose, the uniqueness issue is not crucial. Actually, the comparison of the two optima, based on …rst-order conditions, keeps its entire signi…cance even when the uniqueness of the social optima under comparison does not prevail, because we know that the optimum, whatever it is, must necessarily satisfy the associate set of …rst-order conditions. 1 4 Note that assigning a high value to life coïncides with a low level of c, and not with a high level of c. The reason is that, if agents value strongly the mere fact of being alive, even extremely low consumption levels will make them regard life as better than death. Therefore the threshold c must be very low in that case.
1 5 See Deardor¤ (1976) and Michel and Pestieau (1993) on the interiority of the optimal fertility rate. See de la Croix et al (2012) on the interiority of the optimum survival rate.
The egalitarian …rst-best problem
Let us now contrast the average utilitarian social optimum with the ex post egalitarian social optimum. Whereas average utilitarianism can be interpreted as the maximization of the expected welfare of a representative agent from an ex ante perspective (see Hammond 1981) , the ex post egalitarian optimum considers, on the contrary, what maximizes the realized -rather than expected -welfare of the worst-o¤ individuals at the stationary equilibrium.
The motivations for focusing on the worst-o¤ individuals are the following. Clearly, the social objective behind the standard Golden Rule -i.e. the maximization of the steady-state average welfare -makes a lot of sense in the context where the Golden Rule was initially studied: a context where cohorts are all made of identical agents. However, once risky mortality is introduced, taking the maximization of average welfare seems less adequate from an ethical perspective. In our model, individuals are all identical ex ante, but some persons will, ex post, turn out to have a shorter life than others. Given that being long-lived or short-lived is here a matter of pure luck, it makes sense to take, as a social objective, not the maximization of average welfare, but, rather, the maximization of the welfare of the unlucky, worst-o¤ individuals. 16 Since the worst-o¤ agents at the steady-state can be either the short-lived, who enjoy a lifetime welfare equal to u(c), or the long-lived, who enjoy a lifetime welfare u(c) + u(d), the social planner's problem is here:
That social planning problem is less straightforward than the standard utilitarian problem. The reason is that the objective function to be maximized is continuous but not di¤erentiable. However, the identi…cation of the worst-o¤ agents in the population can help us to rewrite that planning problem in a more convenient manner.
Actually, whereas common sense identi…es the worst-o¤ individuals with the short-lived ones, this is not necessarily the case. Whether the short-lived or the long-lived is the worst-o¤ depends on whether second-period consumption d exceeds the welfare neutral level c or not:
In the light of that condition, we can rewrite the above social planner's problem under a much simpler form. Actually, the egalitarian planning problem can be rewritten as the maximization of the welfare of the short-lived individuals (i.e. u(c)) subject to the constraint that the lifetime welfare of the long-lived individuals is not inferior to the lifetime welfare of the short-lived ones (i.e. u(c) + u(d) u(c)). Indeed, if we had u(d) < 0, long-lived agents would be worse o¤ than short-lived agents, so that the objective of maximizing the welfare of the short-lived would not make sense. Hence the egalitarian social planner's problem consists in maximizing the welfare of the short-lived subject to the constraint u(d) 0, and can thus be rewritten as:
where denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint, is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint for welfare at the old age, whereas is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint for health investment. The …rst-order conditions are:
with complementary slackness. From FOC (19), it appears that the optimal capital accumulation remains determined by the standard Golden Rule. FOC (21) suggests that the optimal level of health investment h is a corner solution, and equal to 0. 17 That corner solution for health investment may seem surprising, but is actually quite intuitive: for the unlucky agents who do not reach the old age, preventive spending is a waste of resources, so that it is optimal to set those expenditures to zero. Regarding the last two FOCs, it is clear that it is optimal to exhaust the economy's resources, so that the budget constraint is, at the optimum, a strict equality. Moreover, regarding consumption at the old age, we must have, at the optimum, that second-period consumption d equals c, in such a way as to obtain u(d) = 0.
Substituting for h = 0 and for d = c in (20), we obtain:
We see that, ceteris paribus, the capital dilution e¤ect (i.e. the LHS) is the same as under average utilitarianism, but the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect 1 7 Indeed, an interior health investment would require the LHS of (21) to be equal to 0, that is:
The …rst term of the LHS is necessarily positive, and the second term as well, so that this equality is always violated.
(i.e. the RHS) is here weakened in comparison to what holds under utilitarianism. The reason is that, under an interior utilitarian optimum, we necessarily have u(d) > 0, implying d > c. 18 As a consequence, we can expect, ceteris paribus, fewer children under egalitarianism than under average utilitarianism. Thus the possibility of an optimal fertility rate strictly smaller than the replacement rate n = 1 is, ceteris paribus, more plausible here than under the average utilitarian optimum. The possibility of an optimal fertility lower than the replacement rate is, ceteris paribus, larger when the minimum survival chance~ is low, and when the welfare neutral consumption level c is also low. 19 Note, however, that this result is only true under a given k, so that further calculations will be necessary to have an unambiguous comparison of the two social optima. Prior to this, Proposition 2 summarizes our results.
Proposition 2
The egalitarian …rst-best optimum fc ; d ; k ; n ; h g is such that:
Proof. See the above FOCs. As under the utilitarian optimum, it may be the case that several vectors fc ; d ; k ; n ; h g satisfy the above conditions. Hence the uniqueness of the egalitarian optimum is not guaranteed. However, in order to compare the utilitarian and the egalitarian optima, it is not necessary to be certain that each of those social optima is unique. Indeed, given that each social optimum necessarily satis…es a set of …rst-order conditions (mentioned in Proposition 1 for the utilitarian optimum, and in Proposition 2 for the egalitarian one), the comparison of the two optima based on the study of those …rst-order conditions leads to conclusions that hold whatever those optima are unique or not.
When comparing the egalitarian and utilitarian …rst-best optima, some obvious di¤erences appear. First, the optimal level of prevention under the egalitarian optimum, which is equal to zero, is lower than under utilitarianism (when the utilitarian optimum is an interior solution). The reason is that, from the point of view of average welfare, it makes sense to spend some resources to raise the survival probability. On the contrary, from the point of view of a short-lived person, preventive health spending are just a waste of resources.
The comparison of optimal consumption levels is more complex, since it depends on the optimal level of capital and fertility under the two social objectives. Let us take, as a starting point, the case where fertility is not chosen by the social planner, but is equal to an exogenous level n = n. In that case, the optimal capital satis…es, under utilitarianism and egalitarianism, the same condition, which is the standard Golden Rule:
Given that both and n are constant, the optimal capital is the same whatever the social objective is. That result is quite intuitive. Our egalitarian social objective cares about the worst-o¤ individuals living at the steady-state, and, as such, focuses on intragenerational justice. On the contrary, the Golden Rule, which aims at maximizing consumption possibilities at the stationary equilibrium, concerns the intergenerational allocation of resources, and remains thus relevant under our (intragenerational) egalitarian objective. Indeed, the Golden Rule guarantees the largest aggregate consumption possibilities at the steadystate, and those consumption possibilities can be used di¤erently depending on the adopted conception of intragenerational justice.
But that kind of intra-versus intergenerational separation result collapses once fertility is chosen by the social planner. Indeed, in that general case, the optimal capital and fertility levels satisfy respectively: 20
for the utilitarian optimum, and f 0 (k e ) = + n e 1 k e =~ (n e ) 2 c for the egalitarian optimum. From those conditions, it can be shown that the two optimal capital and fertility levels di¤er under the two social objectives. While calculations are left to the Appendix, Proposition 3 summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 Under the utilitarian and the egalitarian optima, we have:
if f 0 (k) + 1 > 2k! 0 (k), we have: k u > k e and n u < n e ; if f 0 (k) + 1 = 2k! 0 (k), we have: k u = k e and n u = n e ; if f 0 (k) + 1 < 2k! 0 (k), we have: k u < k e and n u > n e .
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology y t = Ak t , we have, under a full depreciation of capital, that:
if > 1=2, we have: k u > k e and n u < n e ; if = 1=2, we have: k u = k e and n u = n e ;
if < 1=2, we have: k u < k e and n u > n e .
Proof. See the Appendix. Hence, the egalitarian optimum may, in general, involve a lower or a higher capital than the utilitarian optimum once the fertility is also chosen by the social planner. The prevailing inequality depends on the level of the depreciation rate of capital , as well as on the properties of the production process.
As stated in the second part of Proposition 3, we can see that, under a full depreciation of capital = 1 and a Cobb-Douglas production function with < 1=2 (as usually calibrated), the optimal capital under egalitarianism is superior to its level under average utilitarianism. Inversely, the optimal fertility is larger under utilitarianism. Note that this comparison does not tell us whether a particular social optimum involves a fertility rate strictly lower than the replacement fertility n = 1. However, we know for sure that, in the case of < 1=2, if the utilitarian optimum involves a fertility rate lower than the replacement level, this will be also the case for the egalitarian optimum, since this optimum involves a lower fertility than the utilitarian one.
Hence, even if the optimal capital remains, under egalitarianism, still determined by an accumulation rule that looks pretty much like the standard Golden Rule, i.e. f 0 (k) = + n 1, the mere fact that egalitarianism involves a lower optimal fertility implies also a higher optimal capital than under average utilitarianism. The reason is the following. Egalitarianism, by focusing on the worst-o¤ individuals in the cohort, recommends a welfare-neutral consumption at the old age, which restricts the intergenerational gains from fertility. The "Samuelson e¤ect" being reduced, the optimal fertility under egalitarianism is lower, implying a higher optimal capital. Thus, contrary to what one may expect, egalitarianism reinforces the necessity to accumulate capital.
In sum, the egalitarian social objective recommends, in comparison to average utilitarianism, a lower old-age consumption, and a lower preventive health spending. Those di¤erences leave the optimal capital equal to its utilitarian optimal level when the fertility rate is exogenously given. However, once fertility is also a part of the social planner's optimization problem, the egalitarian optimum involves, in general, a higher capital and a lower fertility than under utilitarianism. Thus, it is through the optimal fertility decision that the shift to egalitarianism a¤ects the optimal capital accumulation. Without that channel, egalitarianism would imply the same capital level as under utilitarianism.
The egalitarian second-best problem
The egalitarian …rst-best solution may face strong resistance among policy circles. Imposing a zero investment in health in the name of the -possibly fewunlucky individuals who turn out to be short-lived is questionable. This is the reason why we now turn to a second-best framework, where health expenditures take an interior value. In this section, we will consider the social planner's problem in a second-best context, where health spending are not directly chosen by the social planner. For that purpose, we consider three distinct cases: 21 A1 Health spending per worker are constant: h t = h > 0. A2 Health spending per worker are a constant fraction of labour productivity: h t = !(k t ).
A3 Health spending per worker are a constant fraction of the output per worker: h t = f (k t ).
The case A1 coincides with standard OLG models with …xed life expectancy 1 + ( h). 22 The case A2 includes the economy considered by Chakraborty (2004) . The case A3 makes health spending depend on the whole social income.
Under case A1, the egalitarian social planner's problem can be rewritten as:
where is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint, whereas is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint for old-age welfare u(d). The …rst-order conditions are:
with complementary slackness. From (27), it appears that, as in the …rst-best problem, the optimal capital accumulation remains determined by the standard Golden Rule. Old-age consumption remains equal to c. Note also that, on the basis of (28), we obtain that, because of the higher preventive spending, there is now a higher intergenerational redistribution e¤ect, which leads to a higher fertility ceteris paribus.
Turning now to cases A2 and A3, the social planner's problem becomes:
where denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint, whereas is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint u(d) 0. The …rst-order conditions are:
with complementary slackness. As above, second-period consumption equals the welfare-neutral level c. Substituting for d = c, one can rewrite (33) as:
That equality characterizes the optimal second-best capital level. Note that, under h 0 (k) = 0, we are back to the standard Golden Rule. However, once capital accumulation raises health investment, the optimal capital becomes, ceteris paribus, lower than under the standard Golden Rule. That comparison holds only ceteris paribus, that is, for an equal fertility level n. One can, nonetheless, expect the optimal fertility to di¤er in the …rst-best and in the second-best, simply on the grounds that a higher health investment h raises the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect, inviting a higher optimal fertility for an equal level of capital k. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 4 The egalitarian second-best optimum fc ; d ; k ; n g is such that:
Regarding optimal capital, we have:
under A1 : f 0 (k ) = n + 1
under A2 : f 0 (k ) = n + 1 k f 00 (k ) 1 + 0 (h(k )) n c
under A3 : f 0 (k ) = n + 1 + f 0 (k ) 1 + 0 (h(k )) n c
Proof. See the above FOCs. If fertility was …xed to some exogenous level n = n, the optimal capital at the second-best would be, under case A1, the same as it is at the …rstbest. Moreover, under cases A2 and A3, the optimal second-best capital would be strictly inferior to its …rst-best level. The reason is that a higher capital tends here to foster health investment, and, hence, raises the inactive to active population ratio n , which reduces consumption possibilities ceteris paribus. 23 Hence, it follows that the second-best egalitarian optimal capital is, under case A1, equal to the one under utilitarianism, and, under cases A2 and A3, it is lower than the utilitarian optimal capital. When fertility is a part of the planner's choice, it is more complicated to compare the …rst-best and second-best egalitarian optima. To see this, let us consider the case A1. Comparing the condition for …rst-best (F B) fertility and second-best (SB) fertility, we have:
it appears that, for a given k, the larger survival probability at the second-best raises the Samuelson e¤ect (RHS), and, as such, the optimal fertility is, at the second-best, larger than at the …rst-best for a given k. That result is important, but, here again, the optimal second-best capital is a function of the optimal fertility, so that a ceteris paribus rationale is not satisfactory. Proposition 5 summarizes our results. 24
Proposition 5 Consider case A1. We have:
Assuming Cobb-Douglas production y t = Ak t and a full depreciation of capital, we obtain:
if > 1=2, we have: k eF B < k eSB k u and n eF B > n eSB n u ; if = 1=2, we have: k eF B = k u = k eSB and n u = n eF B = n eSB ; if < 1=2, we have: k eF B > k eSB k u and n eF B < n eSB n u :
Proof. See the Appendix. Hence, if we take the realistic case where < 1=2, the optimal second-best capital under egalitarianism is lower than at the …rst-best, and the optimal second-best fertility is larger than at the …rst-best. The intuition is that the Samuelson e¤ect is reinforced by the larger proportion of survivors associated with h > 0, which pushes, at the end of the day, towards a higher optimal fertility and a lower optimal capital than in the …rst-best. Hence, the extent to which egalitarianism leads to a higher optimal capital than utilitarianism is lower at the second-best than at the …rst-best. Note, however, that, if < 1=2 and h < h u , it is still the case, even at the second-best, that egalitarianism recommends a lower fertility and a higher capital than utilitarianism. The addition of the constraint h > 0 reduces the gap, but it still exists.
In sum, the way in which the introduction of exogenous health investment a¤ects the optimal accumulation depends on whether fertility is part of the planner's choice or not. This dependency on fertility is well illustrated in the case A1 (…xed health investment). When fertility is exogenous, the second-best capital is equal to its …rst-best level. Once fertility is a choice variable, the second-best capital is generally inferior to its …rst-best level, because of a larger Samuelson e¤ect, which pushes towards a larger fertility and a lower capital.
Concluding remarks
The goal of the present paper was to revisit the optimal capital accumulation in the context where lifetime is risky and where individuals turn out to have unequal longevities. For that purpose, we compared, in a two-period OLG model, two long-run social optima. On the one hand, the average utilitarian criterion, which consists of maximizing the average welfare at the stationary equilibrium; on the other hand, the ex post egalitarian criterion, which consists of maximizing the welfare of the worst-o¤ born at the steady-state.
It has been shown that whether egalitarianism leads to a higher optimal capital or not depends on whether fertility is chosen by the social planner or not. When fertility is not chosen, the optimal capital is, under egalitarianism, exactly the same as under utilitarianism. Indeed, in that case, egalitarian concerns, which remain intragenerational, are not relevant for discussing the optimal capital accumulation, which is an intergenerational issue. However, that intragenerational versus intergenerational divide vanishes once fertility is chosen by the social planner. Indeed, in that case, the egalitarian optimum involves, under general conditions, a higher optimal capital than under utilitarianism, and, also, a lower optimal fertility. The reason is that egalitarianism, by implying lower old-age consumption, weakens intergenerational gains from fertility, i.e. the Samuelson e¤ect, and, hence, the optimal fertility. Thus egalitarian concerns do not reduce, but do actually raise optimal capital accumulation. That result is somewhat surprising, since one would expect egalitarian concerns to lower the optimal capital. Nonetheless, the present study shows that, contrary to what one may expect, capital accumulation becomes even more necessary when one is only concerned with the worst-o¤s. That result was also shown to be globally robust to the shift to a second-best set up where health investment is exogenously related to the capital level, even if the introduction of some constrained level of health investment reduces, in general, the optimal capital in comparison to the …rst-best.
Finally, let us notice some limitations of the present study. A …rst issue that remains to be explored consists of the implementability of the egalitarian optimum characterized here. That question can be formulated as follows: under which …scal instruments could a government decentralize the egalitarian social optimum, and induce the fair capital accumulation? That question is not a trivial one, especially when fertility is also endogenous, since, in that case, the study of the decentralization is likely to be sensitive to the structure of parental preferences in terms of fertility. As such, the study of decentralization would require another paper on its own. Besides the implementation issue, one should also remind that the capital accumulation rule studied here is "fair" only in a particular sense. That capital accumulation rule, based on the maximization of the worst-o¤'s welfare, is concerned with correcting for the arbitrariness of the time of death. However, there exists, from the point of view of history, another major source of welfare inequalities, which is also arbitrary: the time of birth. Given that the present study focused on the stationary equilibrium only, this could not deal with that issue, which would require to explore the Generalized Golden Rule and its egalitarian variants in the context of an endogenous demography. This task is also left on our research agenda.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Under A1, the optimal capital under egalitarianism is still given by the standard Golden Rule, but the di¤erence is that the optimal fertility rate n may di¤er signi…cantly in the …rst-best and the second-best. To see this, note that, if one substitutes for the Golden Rule in the FOC for optimal fertility, one obtains:
Hence, if the LHS is increasing in k sb , a higher RHS in the second-best in comparison to the …rst-best (i.e. c ( h) > c~ ) must imply a higher optimal capital level. Therefore, if the condition:
is true, then the second-best optimal capital is larger than the …rst-best optimal capital, and the second-best fertility is lower than the …rst-best fertility. Under a Cobb-Douglas technology and a full depreciation of capital, k sb exceeds k f b if and only if:
A k 1 > 2kA (1 )k 2 () > 1 2 The rest of Proposition 5 follows from grouping that condition with the second part of Proposition 3.
